Abstract. Attempting to reach a minimal number of moves in cryptographic protocols is a quite classical issue. Besides the theoretical interests, minimizing the number of moves can clearly facilitate practical implementations in environments with communication constraints. In this paper, we offer a solution to this problem in the context of undeniable signatures with interactive verification protocols by proposing a way to achieve these protocols in 2 moves. To this goal, we review a scheme we proposed at Asiacrypt 2004 whose property is the full scalability of the signature length against security. We slightly modify (to make it nontransferable) a 2-move version of this scheme which was mentioned in the original article without a proof of security. In the random oracle model, we prove the security of the modified version against an active adversary and precisely assess the security in terms of the signature length. To the best of our knowledge, this scheme is the first 2-move undeniable signature scheme with a security proof.
Introduction
The concept of undeniable signature was introduced by Chaum and van Antwerpen [6] in 1989. The difference between this kind of signature and a classical one is that the verification of a signature cannot be achieved without the cooperation of the signer (originally, for privacy motivations). Namely, by interacting with a verifier in a so-called confirmation (resp. denial) protocol the signer is able to prove the validity (resp. invalidity) of a given message-signature pair. This property opposes to the universal verifiability of classical digital signatures and allows the signer to have a control on the spread of his signatures. Further applications of undeniable signatures such as licensing software or auctions were proposed in the literature. Since then, lots of contributions and new schemes have been published, among them are [3, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19] .
At Eurocrypt 2005, Kurosawa et al. [13] proposed a variant of the scheme of Chaum [5] with 3-move confirmation and denial protocols in the random oracle model. Although this scheme does not achieve non-transferability, it is the first one presenting 3-move protocols with a security proof. Until this scheme proposal, all provably secure interactive undeniable signature schemes were composed of zero-knowledge confirmation and denial protocols which required at least 4 moves. Non-interactive variants of undeniable signatures can be obtained as shown in [12, 15] using a so-called designated verifier technique by using classical techniques for non-transferability. In this setting, the signature is only intended to one designated recipient. To ensure that this one cannot convince another party of the validity of the signature, it is required that the recipient could have been able (with his secret key) to produce the signature. When this can be done perfectly, we say that the scheme satisfies perfect non-transferability. In this case, such (designated verifier) signatures cannot satisfy the non-repudiation property.
The main contribution of this article is to show how to achieve a scheme with interactive protocols having a minimal number of rounds. To this end, we revisit a 2-move variant of the MOVA undeniable signature we mentioned in [17] (without any security proof). In order to achieve perfect non-transferability, we modify the protocols of the MOVA scheme by adding a trapdoor one-way permutation with a secret key associated to the verifier. This differs from the commonly used techniques of trapdoor commitments which does not seem appropriate for a 2-move protocol. In the random oracle model, we provide some formal security proofs on the different required properties related to the confirmation and denial protocols such as the soundness, zero-knowledge and non-transferability. We redo the invisibility and unforgeability analysis in settings where the attacker has access to signing, confirmation and denial oracles. This provides precise security bounds and explain how to select MOVA parameters.
In the next section, we recall the definition of an undeniable signature. Section 3 is devoted to the security model of an undeniable signature. Then, we present the 4-move and modified 2-move versions of the MOVA scheme [17] in Section 4. We prove security properties of the modified 2-move version in the subsequent section. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Undeniable Signature
We consider two players who are the signer (S) and the verifier (V). Let k ∈ N be a security parameter, M be the message space and Σ be the signature space. An undeniable signature scheme is composed of the four following algorithms.
Setup The setup is composed of two probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Setup S and Setup V producing the signer's key pair (K
and the verifier's key pair (K An execution of the confirmation (resp. denial) protocol will be denoted by Confirm S,V ( ) (resp. Deny S,V ( ) ), where is the common input of the players.
Security Model
This section is devoted to the different security notions which are required for an undeniable signature to be secure. We consider four basic security notions related to the confirmation and denial protocols which are the completeness, the soundness, zero-knowledge, and the non-transferability. The last one ensures that a malicious verifier is not able to convince any third party of the validity of the statement (e.g., a given message signature is valid) proven in the protocol. The non-transferability notion may be important in some applications where the validity of the proof itself is valuable (like for licensing software).
Security notions about the undeniable signature are considered as well. We require non-repudiation by resisting adaptive existential forgery attacks. Furthermore, since the motivation of undeniable signature was to avoid the universal verifiability (like for classical signatures), it is important that a scheme satisfies the invisibility property. We will consider an active attacker who has access to some oracles and who will have to distinguish a valid message-signature pair from a randomly picked one.
We recall the definition of the statistical distance between two distributions. Definition 1. The statistical distance ∆ between two random variables X 1 and
Completeness. Given random key pairs (K
) outputs 1 with probability 1 when S and V correctly follow all steps of the protocol. We consider here the two following notions of indistinguishability.
Soundness. Given random key pairs (K
Perfect Zero-Knowledge (resp. Non-Transferability). Both transcript distributions are identical. Statistical Zero-Knowledge (resp. Non-Transferability). The statistical distance between the two transcript distributions is negligible.
We note that the definition of non-transferability allows to avoid some attacks in which the verifier V * identified with K V p forwards messages to the honest signer which were generated by a hidden verifierṼ. Namely, our definition assures that V * with knowledge of K V s could simulate the answer of S (without any help from S) so thatṼ does not have evidence of the proof validity.
Our definition of non-transferability is similar to that proposed by Camenisch and Michels [4] with the main difference that our version assumes thatṼ is computationally unbounded. We can thus assume thatṼ makes no queries to the signing and confirmation/denial oracles. Therefore, the non-transferability of the protocols presented below will also hold with respect to the CamenischMichels definition.
We note that the above definition of zero-knowledge is black-box which means that we require the existence of one "universal" simulator having an oracle access to the verifier which is able to produce an indistinguishable transcript for any verifier. More details about the black-box zero-knowledge notion are given in [10] .
In the standard model, Barak et al. [1] proved that zero-knowledge proofs of an NP-complete language (possibly non-black-box) requires at least 3 moves. To overcome this limitation, the notion of zero-knowledge was extended in the random oracle model (for more details, see [2] ) in which the queries to the random oracles are controlled by the simulator, i.e., it can simulate the output of the oracles provided that the output distribution is correct. Recently, Pass [21] proposed the notion of deniable zero-knowledge in the random oracle. The difference with classical zero-knowledge in the random oracle is that the simulator is no longer allowed to simulate the output of the random oracles, but is only able to observe the queries made to the random oracles as well as the corresponding answers. This actually means that the simulator's transcript really corresponds to the view of the verifier. In this model, Pass [21] showed that 2 moves are necessary to achieve zero-knowledge for NP and proposed a general 2-move protocol for NP which is not very convenient for practical purposes. In our results, proofs of zero-knowledge in the random oracle will be deniable as well.
Existential Unforgeability. We consider the standard security notion of existential forgery under an adaptive chosen-message attack as defined by Goldwasser et al. [11] for classical digital signatures. This notion is similar to Kurosawa-Heng [13] and is adapted as follows.
An undeniable signature scheme is secure against an existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attack if there exists no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm F which wins the following game with a non-negligible probability.
Game: Invisibility. We use a similar definition as Kurosawa-Heng [13] . Consider first a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm D called invisibility distinguisher and the two following games with respect to a bit b. Note that this definition is similar to that of Galbraith et al. [8] except that the distinguisher is not allowed to query m * to the signing oracle in our definition. The invisibility notion of Galbraith et al. cannot be satisfied when the signature is deterministic (which is the case for MOVA). This will be discussed in Remark 6.
We define the advantage of the distinguisher as follows
Adv inv-cma D := Pr b = 1 in Game inv-cma-1 − Pr b = 1 in Game inv-cma-0 ,
MOVA Scheme
In this section, we present the scheme proposed in [17] as well as the underlying principles. This scheme generalizes the MOVA scheme [18] proposed earlier in 2004 in a very natural way and therefore will be called MOVA as well.
Preliminaries
We first recall some definitions, useful lemmas, and mathematical problems from [17] related to the interpolation of group homomorphisms.
Let G and H be two Abelian groups. 
The set of points S interpolates in a group homomorphism.
Although, our treatment uses arbitrary G, H, d, p, the implementation analysis of [16] suggests that parameters G = Z * n (for n product of two primes), d = p = 2 lead to the most efficient protocols for the signer. The homomorphisms are the Legendre symbols in G.
n-S-GHI Problem (Group Homomorphism Interpolation Prob. [17] ) Parameters: Two Abelian groups G and H, a set of s points S ⊆ G×H, and n ∈ N. Instance Generation: n elements x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ U G are picked uniformly at random.
polates with S in a group homomorphism. The success probability of an n-S-GHIP solver A will be denoted by Succ
n-S-GHID Problem (n-S-GHI Decisional Problem) Parameters: Two Abelian groups G and H, a set of s points S ⊆ G×H and n ∈ N. Instance Generation: The instance T is generated according to one of the two following ways and is denoted T 0 or T 1 respectively. T 0 is a set of points {(
n picked uniformly at random such that it interpolates with S in a group homomorphism. T 1 is picked uniformly at random in (G × H) n . Problem: Decide whether the instance T is of type T 0 or T 1 .
The advantage of an n-S-GHID distinguisher D is given by
where b denotes the output bit of D.
The S-GHI (resp. S-GHID) problem defined in [17] corresponds to the 1-S-GHI (resp. 1-S-GHID) problem. We consider the n-S-GHI and n-S-GHID problems for sets S which interpolate in a unique group homomorphism. Hence, S defines a homomorphism. The n-S-GHI problem consists in computing it on n elements. The n-S-GHID problem consists in deciding whether a set of points T is in its graph.
Interactive Proofs
The original version of the MOVA scheme makes use of two 4-move interactive proofs, namely one for the confirmation protocol and one for the denial protocol. In the first proof, a prover proves that a set of points interpolates in a group homomorphism known by himself. In the second one, the prover knows a group homomorphism which interpolates in a set of points S and proves that a second set of points T does not interpolate in this group homomorphism. These two proofs, taken from [17] , are given below. Again, G, H denote two Abelian groups and d := |H| is the order of H with smallest prime factor p. The group homomorphism which is known by the prover is denoted by f . The security parameter of the following proofs is an integer denoted by .
The verifier picks r i ∈ U G and a i,j ∈ U Z d uniformly at random for i = 1, . . . , and j = 1, . . . , s. He computes 1,1 , . . . , u ,t ) and w := (w 1,1 , . . . , w ,t ). He sends u and w to the prover.
Note that this requires to select H in which one can extract discrete logarithms lying in the restricted set {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. In practice, this may not be a problem since we prefer p = 2 as shown in [16] .
to find every λ i if the verifier is honest since z k = y k for at least one k. Otherwise, he sets λ i to a random value. He then sends a commitment to λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ ) to the verifier. 3: The verifier sends all r i,k 's and a i,j,k 's to the prover. 4: The prover checks that u and w were correctly computed. He then opens the commitment to λ. 5: The verifier checks that the prover could find the right λ.
In the original article [17] , a 2-move variant for these two protocols was suggested without a proof. The variant is achieved by removing the two messages sent in the middle of the protocol for achieving the zero-knowledge property through the commitment scheme. In order to maintain zero-knowledge, the verifier sends a kind of commitment on a seed which generates the challenges to the prover. This commitment can only be opened by the prover after this one solved the challenges. We notably modify the original 2-move protocols by adding a trapdoor one-way permutation with associated secret key K 
2-GHIproof (S)
The verifier picks seedC ∈ U {0, 1} kc uniformly at random, and by applying a pseudorandom generator GenC on this seed, generates values r i ∈ G and a i,j ∈ Z d for i = 1, . . . , and j = 1, . . . , s. He Note that the complexity of both protocols are comparable to their 4-move variants.
MOVA Description
Below, we briefly present the MOVA scheme. For a more detailed description, we refer to [17] . The main goal of the setup is to ensure that the points (Xkey i , Ykey i )'s uniquely characterize Hom to avoid that several secret keys correspond to the same public key. This is necessary to guarantee the non-repudiation of the signature scheme. For this, one can either put many enough points or produce an interactive or non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of unique interpolation. These additional setup variants are described in [17] . In fact, the different setup variants ensure that Xkey 1 , . . . , Xkey Lkey Ygroup-generate Xgroup. In this case, we say that the public key is valid. Otherwise, the signer aborts. Denial Protocol. Given an alleged invalid message-signature pair (m, σ) as input and an integer Iden a security parameter, we denote the signature σ = (Zsig 1 , . . . , Zsig Lsig ). The signer and the verifier retrieve the Xkey i 's and Xsig j 's. The signer checks the invalidity of (m, σ). If this one is really invalid, they run the protocol coGHIproof Iden (S, T ) on the sets
Setup
The 2-move version of MOVA is exactly as above except that GHIproof and coGHIproof are replaced by 2-GHIproof and 2-coGHIproof respectively.
Security of the 2-Move MOVA Scheme
Here, we prove that the 2-move modified version of the MOVA scheme satisfies the security properties mentioned in Section 3. The proofs of resistance against forgery attacks and invisibility were inspired from [13] . 1 , Ykey 1 ) 
Theorem 3. Let S = {(Xkey
Succ Lsig-S-GHIP B ≤ ε.
Then, any forger F with similar complexity using q S signing queries and q V queries to the confirmation/denial oracle wins the existential forgery game under an adaptive chosen-message attack with a probability
Succ ef-cma F ≤ e(1 + q S )(1 + q V )ε.
Assume that for any algorithm B with a given complexity, we have

Adv
Lsig-S-GHID B
≤ ε and Succ
Lsig-S-GHIP B
≤ ε .
Then, any distinguisher D with similar complexity using q S signing queries and q V queries to the confirmation/denial oracle wins the invisibility game under a chosen-message attack with advantage
Remark 4. The soundness and zero-knowledge of the confirmation and denial protocols as well as the invisibility and the resistance to existential forgery attacks hold in the random oracle model.
Remark 5.
Similarly to [14] , the efficiency of the security reduction for the existential forgery can be improved (factor (1 + q V ) −1 is removed) by replacing GHI problem by its gap variant [20] . This problem consists in solving the GHI problem using an access to an oracle which solves the GHID problem. This one helps to simulate the confirmation and denial oracles.
Proof. Below we prove Theorem 3. Completeness is omitted since it is obvious.
Soundness of Confirmation. Let S
* be a cheating prover who wants to confirm the validity of an invalid signature σ = (Zsig 1 , . . . , Zsig Lsig ). Note that S * is fed with the signer secret key K S s . Without loss of generality, we can assume that S * always responds correctly to the verifier whenever he queries seedC to GenC. Indeed, he can check that seedC is the preimage of ϑ c by TPOW and answer seedC to the challenge if correct. (With an honest verifier, there is no need to check whether the challenge is valid.) Hence, the verifier always accepts when the prover queries seedC to GenC. Similarly, we can assume that S * always responds correctly to the verifier whenever he queries the right w to H c because he can deduce seedC from h c afterwards. Note that when S * interacts with an honest verifier, the verifier only accepts if S * outputs seedC. We transform S * into an algorithm to invert the trapdoor permutation as follows.
1. We receive a random challenge ϑ c , whose preimage by TPOW is denoted seedC. 2. We generate the key material for the MOVA signature and generate some random values r i 's and a i,j 's. We deduce some u i 's and w i 's and pick a random h c . Then (u, h c , ϑ c ) is a challenge for the prover. We simulate GenC as follows: for any query except seedC (we can check whether a value is seedC by checking that its image by TPOW is ϑ c ) we simulate a random oracle as usual i.e., we maintain a list of elements queried to GenC with corresponding answers and simulate according to this list. If the query is new, we simply pick the answer at random and add the pair in the list. For the query seedC we stop the overall simulation and yield seedC: the inversion of ϑ c succeeded. We simulate H c as follows: for any query except w = (w 1 , . . . , w Icon ) we simulate a random oracle (like for GenC). For the query w we stop: the inversion of ϑ c failed. 3. We run S * according to our simulation rules. If S * outputs some value, we check whether it is seedC. If it is, we output it, otherwise we fail.
The algorithm succeeds to invert the trapdoor permutation at the condition that either (event A) S * succeeds without even querying seedC to GenC nor w to H c , or (event B) that S * queries seedC to GenC without querying w to H c beforehand. Let C be the event that S * queries w to H c before querying seedC to GenC. Since the simulation is perfect, Pr[A∪B]+Pr[C] is the probability that S * passes the protocol with an honest verifier. We have Pr[A ∪ B] ≤ Succ inv-tp . Below we show an upper bound for Pr [C] . To this, we consider a simulator B which plays with S * to win the following game: Game: A challenger picks elements r i 's and a i,j 's uniformly at random and compute u i = dr i + , σ) is invalid, the simulator outputs abort. Note that an honest signer would check exactly the same equalities (in a different way) and would answer exactly in the same way. Hence, the non-transferability is perfect.
Non-transferability of Denial. This proof is similar.
Straight-Line Zero-Knowledge of Confirmation. If V * is given K V s , the simulation can be done perfectly as for the non-transferability. Now, we consider that V * (and the simulator B) is not given K V s . B runs the verifier V * and looks at the queries made by V * to the oracle GenC. B puts these q GenC queries seedC k for 1 ≤ k ≤ q GenC as well as the corresponding answers of GenC in memory. The simulator then receives the first message M of V * . If this one has not a correct format, the simulator outputs the transcript (M, abort). Otherwise, the simulator checks whether one answer among those queries seedC k 's made to GenC generates the challenges u i 's correctly and the image of this query by TPOW is equal to ϑ c . If it is not the case, B outputs the transcript (u 1 , . . . , u Icon , h c , ϑ c , abort). Otherwise, the simulator is able to compute the right w i 's from this answer (the right r i 's and a i,j 's) using the homomorphic property of Hom, namely w i = Hom(u i ) = , h c , ϑ c , abort) .
It remains to show that the two transcript distributions are statistically indistinguishable. When the first message has not a correct format, the two transcripts are clearly identical. Let consider the case where the verifier did not query any seedC k which produces the challenges u i 's and whose image by TPOW leads to ϑ c . In this case, the honest prover will not abort the protocol only if he retrieves a seedC = H(w 1 , . . . , w Icon ) ⊕ h c which generates the challenges u i 's and ϑ c . This occurs only if the verifier V * was able to guess that the output values of the query seedC to the oracle GenC generate the right r i 's and a ij 's. Since GenC is a random oracle, no polynomial time verifier V * can succeed to do that with a non-negligible probability. We still have to consider the case where the verifier queried a seedC k which produces the challenges u i 's and ϑ c . We see that the two transcripts are always identical, since the simulator clearly knows the answer of the honest prover by learning the right w i 's. Therefore, we can conclude that the two transcript distributions are statistically indistinguishable.
Straight-Line Zero-Knowledge of Denial. This proof is similar.
Unforgeability. Let F be a forger who succeeds to existentially forge a signature under an adaptive chosen-message attack with a non-negligible probability ε. We will construct an algorithm B which solves the Lsig-S-GHI problem with S := {(Xkey 1 , Ykey 1 ), . . . , (Xkey Lkey , Ykey Lkey )} using the forger F and K V s . At the beginning, B receives the challenges x 1 , . . . , x Lsig ∈ Xgroup of the Lsig-S-GHI problem. Then, B runs the forger and simulates the queries to the random oracle GenS, q S queries to the signing oracle Sign and q V queries to the denial/confirmation oracle Ver. We can assume that all messages sent to Sign resp. Ver were previously queried to GenS (since the oracle Sign resp. Ver has to make such queries anyway). B simulates the oracles GenS and Sign as follows: As for the full-domain hash technique [7] and as in [13] , the optimal q opt = q S /(q S + 1). Thus, the success probability is greater or equal to (1/e(1 + q S )(1 + q V ))ε.
Invisibility. Let D be a distinguisher which breaks the invisibility of the MOVA scheme with an advantage ε. We construct an algorithm B which solves the Lsig-S-GHID problem by using D and K V s . At the beginning, B is challenged with a tuple {(
Lsig for which it has to decide whether Hom(x i ) = y i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ Lsig or if this tuple was picked at random. Like for the proof of the existential forgery, the simulator B runs D and simulates the queries to the random oracle GenS, q S queries to the signing oracle Sign and the queries to the denial/confirmation oracle Ver. We can assume that each message queried to Sign or Ver was previously queried to the random oracle GenS. We assume that no query m to Ver was submitted to Sign beforehand. (Otherwise, we can just simulate them with K V s .) Let Forge be the event in which D sends a valid message-signature pair to Ver. We first remove all instances for which the event Forge occurs. So, we can now assume that D never submits any valid pair (m, σ) to Ver such that m was not previously submitted to Sign. B simulates the oracles just like in the proof of unforgeability with = q V + 1 (we excluded valid forged pairs).
After a given time, the distinguisher D sends a message m * to the challenger of the invisibility game which is simulated by B. We can assume that m * was queried to GenS (otherwise B simulates a new query). If the answer of m * to GenS was of type-1, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, it sends the challenge signature (Ysig * Finally, D outputs a guess bit b . The simulator B outputs the same bit b as guess bit to the Lsig-S-GHID challenger or a random bit when B aborted.
Using the homomorphic property of Hom, we deduce that the set {(
interpolates in a group homomorphism with the set of points We can conclude by noting that Forge occurs with a probability bounded by e(1 + q S )(1 + q V )ε by assertion 5.
Remark 6. MOVA scheme can be made probabilistic so that the invisibility notion defined in [8] is satisfied. To this, it suffices to append some randomness r to the message to sign and to add r in the signature. The drawback is that the signature enlarges.
Consequences for the Signature Parameters. One of the main advantage of MOVA scheme as stated in [17] is the fully scalable signature size. It was argued that one could potentially consider signatures of size of 20 bits, but the corresponding security level was not precisely quantified. Namely, the efficiency of the security reduction in [17] is not detailed and the security model did not consider queries to the confirmation/denial oracle. Our security reduction provides a more precise result. Assuming that any solver with same computational resource as a given forger cannot solve Lsig-S-GHI problem with a probability significatively greater than |Ygroup| −Lsig , the assertion 5 of Theorem 3 shows that we have Succ ef-cma F
≤ |Ygroup|
−Lsig e(q S + 1)(q V + 1). Note that the assumption can be reached by scaling Xgroup adequately, namely without any modification of the signature size. This is the case when Hom is the Legendre symbol (·/p) defined on an RSA modulus n = pq. A signature size of Lsig ≥ 52 bits achieves a success probability for the existential forgeability of at most 2 −20 with q S = 2 10 and q V = 2 20 . Similarly, assuming that Adv 
Conclusion
We revisited a 2-move variant of the MOVA undeniable signature scheme which was proposed without any proof. By using a trapdoor one-way permutation adequately, we were able to make the verification protocols non-transferable. All the other required security properties are thoroughly analyzed in the random oracle model, thereby allowing to quantify the security of the different properties in terms of the signature parameters. So, as far as we know, this is the first time a provably secure undeniable signature scheme with 2-move confirmation and denial protocols is obtained. This result shows that minimal number of moves in an undeniable signature with interactive protocols can be reached in practice.
